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Summary findings
Drawing  on game theory concepts, Hallett and Primo  trade within the bloc is not accompanied  by any incrcase
Braga discuss  why countries form themselves  into trading  in the bloc's external barriers  (an  open" bloc).
blocs and what the rclations between  these blocs are  Widening tends to be easier  the more open a bloc is,
likely  to bc.  since insiders  arc less  concerned with the erosion of their
They identifyr  three types of trade regime:  preferences.
* Unilateral  trade policies  - which are  In che alternative scenario, lower intra-bloc  trade and
noncooperative.  investmcInt  barriers are accompanied  by an increase  in
* Multilateral  agreements (such as the GATT)-  the external barriers, giving  any specific  set of potential
which are cooperative.  participants strong incentives  to join (a 'closed" bloc).
*  Coalitions (regional  integration arrangements  or  'Deepening" by expanding  the list of variables  covered
minilateral  agrecments)  -which  are nmixed  (cooperative  by the trade agreemenr  also tends to make the bloc more
internally  and noncooperative  externally).  cohesive.  In both cases  - a closed bloc or deep
They argue that regional integration  arrangements  can  integration  - greater cohesion is obrained at the cost of
work better than global rules as precommitment  devices  increasing  the costs of entry for nonmembers.
for internally cooperative policies  because  they creare a  The hope that regional integration arrangements  can
denser network or interlinked policy  targets. The losses  pave the way for global  free trade is unrealistic.  As
for a participant ostracized  (or disciplined)  by his bloc  regional integration  arrangements enlarge, they may be
are immediate  and tangible.  better off exerting market power against  outsiders rather
Crucial  to the results of analysis  is the external policy  than following  a globally  cooperative path. Inter-bloc
stance adopted by each bloc after it has formed.  External  trade relations will ultimately  depend on how effective
relations will determine whether regional  blocs are  special  interest groups are at distorting bloc-wide  trade
welfare-improving,  consistent  with the aims  of the  policies  that suit their interests.  A multilateral  trade
GAIT, and a vehicle  for securing commitments  to the  system  inhibits  noncooperative  behavior among trading
regime; or whether they will become  a vehicle  for  blocs.  The successful  conclusion  of the Uruguay  Round
spreading  "political  economy biases."  extended and deepened the network of variables  covered
Should higher or lower external barriers be expected  by multilateral  rules. For developing  countries, a
for nonmembers?  That depends on how large the  working (even imperfect)  multilateral  trade system
benefits  or costs, in trade and investment  creation (or  remains  the best hope against excesses  by those with
diversion),  would he to members  if the move to free  market  power.
This  paper-a  productof the InternationalTrade  Division,  International  Economics  Department-is  part of a larger  effort
in the departmnent  to understand new regionalism  in trade policy. Copies of the paper are available  free from the World
Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Anna Kim,  room R2-042, extension 33715 (36 pages).
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Carlos A. Primo Brap.THE  NEW  REGIONALISM  AND THE  THREAT  OF  PROTECTIONISM
Andrew  Hughes  Hallett  Carlos  A. Primo  Braga'
L INTRODUCTION
It has become  fashionable  to assert  that regionalism  is not only  back, but that this  time it is here
to stay (Bhagwati,  1992). The fact  that preferential  trade agreements  affect  a significant  share  of global
trade  flows  is not a new  development. Recent  regional  integration  arrangements  (RIAs),  however,  have
attracted a great deal of interest because they are broader in scope than previous experiments  in
integration  and because  they encompass  North-South  reciprocal  arrangements. Moreover,  there is a
growing  perception  that  RIAs  are becoming  the policy  regime  with the greatest  influence  on trade flows.
What are the incentives  which  lead countries  to form themselves  into tading blocs? Once we
have discussed  these incentives,  we can say somehing about the welfare implications  (and likely
outcomes)  of a world of regional  trading  blocs, as compared  to a world of global  (the GATT  regime)  or
non-cooperative  (unilateral)  trading  arrangements.  We build this analysis  up from a game  theory  basis
and introduce  the new trade theory as a particular  version of this kind of argumentL That makes it
easier tO  see what the new  trade theory  has to say about  the benefits  of liberalizing  trade on a regional
basis.
1  A. Hughes  Hallett is a professor  at Strathclyde  University  and Visiting  Professor  at Princeton
University.  Carlos A. Primo Braga is a senior economist  with the Intemational  Trade Division,
Interuational  Economics  Department,  World Bank. Comments  by K. Anderson,  J.M. Finger, P. Low
and W. Martin are gratefully  acknowledged. The findings, interpretations  and conclusions  are the
authors'  own. They  should  not  be attributed  to the  World  Bank,  its Board  of Directors,  its management,
or any of its member  countries.
2  Trading  blocs  proliferated  between  the wars even  though the grouping  was rather different  then
(being  based  on empire  or spheres  of influence)  and  the "contractual"  arrangements  were less  formal  than
at present  (Eichengreen  and  Irwin, 1993). The demonstration  effect  of the 'Treaty of Rome"  and the
pursuit  of import-substitution  industrialization  led to nmnerous  regional  initiatives  among  developing
countries  in the 1960s. By 1988, more than 40 Fer cent of world trade was occurring  within  regions
under  preferential  conditions  (Primo  Braga  and Yeats  1992).
3  By "new  trade  theory"  we refer  to the body  of literature  that over  the last two decades  has brought
imperfect  competition  to the forefront  of discussions  about  trade policy. For a survey  of this literature
see  Helpman  and  Krugman  (1989).2
If we can say that there are obvious incentives  for forming regional blocs, compared to a regime
of unilateral trade initiatives or an incomplete and imperfectly functioning GAIT  system, we still have
to ask what the trading arrangements  between the blocs are likely to be.  If they are nonoroperative, then
we have to balance the gains from freer trade internally against any potential losses from less trade
between blocs, in order to determine whether this regime is a Pareto improvement over the current
situation and also to determine whether the losses against the Pareto optimum of free trade everywhere
(which participants may not wish to risk committing themselves to, if they think others may be tempted
to deliult) are acceptably small. The incentives  to commit may be higher within regional blocs because
of the opporanity to  deepen' the agreement by linking a number of targets into one cooperative  regime.
But if the process of forming blocs is more likely either to leave the existing barriers as they are
or to lower them (i.e., promote a more cooperative trade regime), then we must ask whether allowing
countries to form trade blocs and then lower the barriers between blocs - a series of mini-GAITs in
which nonmembers are always welcome to join - might not be an easier way of achieving the ideal of
free trade than negotiating multilateral arrangements  (and sanctions)  within a global GATT framework.
In section II,  we discuss what the new trade theory has to say about regionalism.  Special
atention is given to the incentive  structure that could explain the recent drift towards regionalism. The
paper goes on to discuss what are the implications of the new regionalism  for the GA7T system (section
Il)  and the role of special interests in shaping trading blocs (section IV).'  It ends with a brief analysis
of the potential implications of the new regionalism  for developing countries.
H. THE NEW TRADE THEORY AND RIAs
In a recent survey, Gunter (1989) identified  three main phases in the literature on RIAs. The first
phase, inaugurated  by Jacob Vimers seminal contribution (Viner, 1950), focused on the welfare effects
4  We assume that governments trv to maximize their political support, as well as social welfare.
Voters (as consumers)  face a free-rider problem in supporting fiee-trade. Producer interests, in turn, tend
to be more concentrated and more effective in organizing coalitions to  foster tt  objectives (e.g.,
protection in the case of import-substituting  industries). Govermnents involved in negodations to form
RIAs are more likely to respond to concerns about the trade-creafton aspects of these arragements  (and
their implications for vocal special interests in the member countries such as producers and labor) than
to requests to minimize their trade-diverting consequences (reflecting the interest of producers in non-
member countries).  For further details see Hirschman (1981) and Krueger (1992).3
of preferential  trade arrangements.'  The second  phase  addressed  the more  fundamental  question  of why
customs  unions  are formed, since it can be shown  that unilateral  non-preferential  liberalization  is a
superior  altemative  in terms  of resource  allocation  under  certain  assumptionsP  The contemporary  phase
of research,  in turn, is identified  as a composite  of efforts  trying to advance  our understanding  of the
effects  of RIAs  on economic  development  and terms  of trade, as well as the role of economies  of scale
in RIAs. A summary  of the different  types  of RIAs  is presented  in Box 1.  In this section,  we re-visit
the two first phases of research on RIAs - to use Gunter's taxonomy  - relying  on a game-theoretic
version  of the new  trade theory.
Box  1: The Different  Meanings  of Regionalism
The term 'regionalism' is used to characterize  a broad array of different  economic  and
political  processes. Typically,  it is used to identify  the formation  of a supra-national  economic
region (i.e., a region in which  governmental  policies  at the national  level play a diminishing  role
in constraining  international  exchange  among  participating  countries). In other circumstances,
however,  the term is used as a synonym  of national  disintegration  (e.g., the splintering  of the
former  Socialist  Federal  Republic  of Yugoslavia).
Economic  regionalism  can  be either  market-driven  or policy-driven.  In the first case,  the
process  is led by private  enterprises,  pursuing  the  gains  from trade  via the integration  of productive
networks,  independendy  of preferential  policies. In other words, market-driven  regionalism  (or
regionalizaton)  is the outcome  of a natural  locational  phenomenon  that  promotes  stronger  economic
ties within  a region  (Lorenz,  1992). Policy-driven  regionalism  (or minilateralism)  is built around
trade preferences  and often complemented  by investment  preferences,  efforts  towards  regulatory
harmonization,  and cooperation  in the development  of joint infrastructure  projects.
RIAs are  characterized  by the fact that they entail reciprocal negotiations  of trade
preferences. There are, however,  many  modalities  of RIAs. Participants  can, for example,  levy
lower tariff  on each other's imports  vis-a-vis  those imposed  on imports from third counties,
forming  a preferential  trade area (PTA). Or they can adopt  zero tariff-s  for the trade between  the
signatories  of the arrangement,  forming  a free trade  area (ETA). If countries  in an FTA also adopt
a common  external  trade policy  against  nonmembers,  then the resulting  RIA is characterized  as a
customs  union  (CU). Common  markets  (CMs),  in turn, correspond  to an agreement  in which  free
trade for goods and services  between  member  countries  comes together  with free movement  of
factors  of production. Finally, a RIA may take the form of an economic  union  (EU), where in
parallel with the formation of  a common market, member countries explicitly  pursue the
harmonization  of their micro and macroeconomic  policies.
'  For a review  of this phase  see Lipsey  (1960).
'  The literature  associated  with this phase  is surveyed  in Krauss (1972).4
rI.1 The Terms  of the  Debate
(a)  Trade Regimes.  We distinguish  three trade regime types: unilateral  trade policies, global  or
multilateral  agreements  (i.e., the GAIT) and  coalitions  (RIAs  or minilateral  agreements).  They are non-
cooperative,  cooperative,  and mixed (cooperative  internally,  noncooperative  externally)  respectively.
Welfare  analyses  typically  focus on the gains in performance,  and their distribution,  from pursuing
liberalization  through  each one of these trade regimes. In the absence  of any legal or constitutional
requirement  for counties to follow free-  trade (or mechanisms  for suprantional income  transfs),
agreements  involving  cooperation  must be self-enforcing.  That means  that each  participant  must enjoy
gains  compared  to alternative  trade regimes  - not  just that participants  must  gain on average. The issue
then  is, do regional  solutions  produce  gains, either  on average  or for all, over unilateralism;  and are  they
inferior  (and  by how  much)  to global  regimes,  or do the coalition  members  benefit  at the expense  of non-
members? That allows  us to evaluate  the incentives  for, and costs and benefits  of, different  trading
regimes.
(b) Political  Eonomv:  Conventional  trade-policy  analyses  assume decision  makers  to be immune  to
domestic  political  pressures. As Grossman  and Helpman  (1993a,  b) point out, the case  for fee  trade,
and  the impact  of different  tariff structures,  have  usually  been  examined  on strictly  economic  criteria  with
non-economic  distrtions not being taken into account  To correct for that we have to build in a
component  which  shows  how  domestic  political-economy  pressures  may  change  the outcomes  of different
regimes? In that world private  sector lobbies  bewme explicit  players  with their own  objectives  for the
decisions  to be made.  They create strategic  interactions  (cooperative  or noncooperative)  between  the
behavior  of goverments and lobbies  - in which  case we get a political  economy  model  of the move
towards  regionalism  or global  arrangemen - r between  different  governments,  conditional  on their
lobbies' reactions  - i.e., a political  economy  evaluation  of "trade  wars? vs. 'trade talks." That allows
us to analyze  how  the trade outcomes  vary from the case  were there is no pressure  from special  interest
groups  and whether  RIAs  reduce  those  distortions.
(c) Strategic  Behavior: The question  then  is how  to combine  the political  economy  interactions  with  the
strategic  behavior  of governments  under  the three regimes  identified  earlier? Because  decision  makers
'  See Magee,  Brock and Young  (1989)  for a political  economy  analysis  of how trade policy is
influenced  by special  interests.5
are now forced to play in two (possibly  three) different  areas of activity  simultaneously  - national
economic  perfbrmance,  regionallglobal  interactions,  and an internal political influence  game - we
propose  simultaneous  or overlapping  games  as a method  for trading-off  outcomes  in different  arenas  (as
well  as between  players)  and show  the advantages  and disadvantages  of regionalism  in particular. The
overlapping  vs.  simultaneous  game formulation  corresponds  to  the  "widening"  vs.  "deepening"
distinction,  which is (as we shall  see) crucial  to evaluating  the outcomes  of the different  types  of trade
policies. These ideas are formalized  in the appendix  to this paper, with some illustrations  of how the
'deepening' vs. "widening"  strategies  fit into a formal  game  theory  framework. The point  made  there
is that  the use of simultaneous/overlapping  games  allows  these  kinds  of interactions  to be analyzed  within
one framework.  In particular  they  show  that  no new  solutiontechniques  are rtplired.  Intead everything
turns on evaluating  the links between the various players  and their theaters of activity;  that is, on
identifying  the stucture of those links.  The analysis  therefore  depends on how you structwe the
problem,  rather than on how you choose  to solve  it.
(d) Iastittions:  To the extent  that  this  trend  towards  regionalism  is concerned  with attempting  to captre
the  benefits  of greater  cooperation,  and  because  we are necessarily  dealing  with simultaneous  interactions
in different  arenas,  we must ask if the world's existing  economic  instutions are appropriate. These
institutions  were founded  to overcome  macroeconomic  adjustment  difficulties,  to relieve  supply side
constraints  in individual  countries,  or to establish  disciplines  for narrowly  defined  trade  policies. But  the
main  challenges  to international  cooperation  are now  presented  by the  externalities  which  economic  events
or policy  actions  in one country  impose  on another. That is a very different  thing  to easing  adjustment
and supply-side  problems,  and  leads  naturally  to the formation  of "managed"  partnerships.  That in turn
may require quite different  institutions  to manage  commitment  at the regional  level, and perhaps, to
regulate  behavior  between  large blocs  that have  market  power at a global  level.  At the regional  level,
the only example  currently  available  is the European  Community  (EC, now  the European  Union)  which
explicitdy  deals  with  an interlinked  network  of different  policy  targets. In section  ml, we argue  that  some
kind of coordinating  supranational  agency is needed  to trade-off  those targets while preserving  the
commitment  to cooperation.
Moreover,  the existing  institutions  are single target institatmfr;;.  dhey  have no objectives  or
competence  outside iheir  designated  arena. Yet  any new  institutions  must be concerned  with facilitating
cooperation  and  trading-off  interactions  between  regimes  and  between  arenas. The broad agenda  of the
Uruguay  Round  and  the proposed  World  Trade Organization  are to a certain  extent explicit  attempts  to6
address this problem.  But as with any cooperation problem, there is the difficulty of demonstrating
credible commitments  by all players.  We argue that the ability to preconmnit  while pursuing a network
of objectives  is easier to accomplish  at a regional level (e.g., by making the different countries' objectives
interdependent  though one regulating - and hence sanctions imposing  - institution)  than at multilateral
level.  These features can be analyzed  through simultaneous  or overlapping games as discussed below.
H.2  The Distinction Between "Open" and "Closed" Blocs
The crucial factor for the results of our analysis  is the external  pol1Lf  stance adopted by each bloc
after it has been formed.  External relations will determine whether regional blocs will be  welfare
improving, consistent with the aims of GATT, and a vehicle for securing commitments to the regime;
or whether they will become a vehicle for spreading "political economy biases."  At a more mundane
level, we have to ask whether higher or lower external barriers vis-a-vis nonmembers  should be expected.
That must turn on)  how large the benefits or costs would be to members in terms of trade and investment
creation (or diversion) if the move to free trade within the bloc is not accompanied by any increase in
the bloc's external barriers (an "open  bloc). Widening tends to be easier the more open a bloc is, since
insiders will be less concerned with the erosion of their preferences.  The alternative scenario is the case
where lower trade and investment intra-bloc barriers are accompanied by an increase in the extera
barriers providing stronger incentives  for any specified set of members to join (a "closed' bloc).'  Note
that "deepening" by expanding the list of variables covered by the trading agreement also tends to make
the bloc more cohesive.  In both cases (a closed bloc or deep integration), greater cohesion is obtained
at the cost of increasing the costs of entry for nonmembers.
Theoretical models show that forming a bloc may benefit members at the cost of nonmembers.'
But it is more likely to turn out that some participants will lose in some industries, or in the performance
of some variables, but gain in others; and for some of them the cost may exceed the gains.  For them,
the bloc may have to be constructed so that those costs are reduced. And if that is done, it will certainly
be at the expense of reducing any benefits which might have accrued to the nonmembers.  Participants
have to be sure that they all gain before they can commit themselves. Theory also suggests that the time
'  At this stage we are abstracting of the possibility of retaliation by outsiders in response to the
formation of a closed trading bloc.  The issue of retaliation is addressed in section IV.
9  See, for example, Bond, Syropoulos  and Winters (1993).7
profile of these gains and losses may be different in the open and closed cases: the cost and benefits do
not all arrive together.  That could make it difficult to persuade participants at their bloc's  potential
sustainability.
There is a trade-off then; more openness generates fewer direct gains for producers in the member
countries, but a larger share of the gains for the rest of the world (which may imply some feed back,
increasing the benefits to member countries).  That implies elements of cooperation.  A more closed
version, by construction, generates greater direct gains for the producers in member countries at the cost
of less for nomnembers (which may in turn adversely affect the gains of the members).  That is the
coalition solution.  Typically therefore import-substituting  producers will favor a more closed bloc;
export-oriented  producers and consumers a more open one.  These kind of conflicts show that special
interest groups within a country or bloc will play an important complicating  role and that we will need
a simultaneous game framework to handle that.
From our perspective, the central questions are: which type of arrangement is most likely, which
would end up benefiting its members most, and would the rest of the world be better or  worse oft?
There are two schools of thought here.  Some maintain the difficulties experienced in bringing the GAIT
negotiations  to an end and the recent proliferation of regional trading blocs signal the breakdown of the
cooperative trading regime.? According to this interpretation, countries are now attempting to increase
the Qarge,  they hope) gains from trade by forming coalitions with their main trading partners at the cost
of losing the small (they hope) benefits of freer trade between blocs of more distant trading partners.
That might make GAIT  unravel to leave a number of free trading blocs with strong barriers between-
them.  That would obviously  be inferior to a system in which everyone has access to one world market
with no barriers.  But compared to the system we have today, we can still ask if members of any given
bloc would actually gain more from reducing their internal  barriers han they would lose from raising the
external barriers to maintain the bloc?  If so, they will be moving from a third-best to a second-best
solution even  though they cannot get to the first-best. But if not, they will be moving from a second-best
to a third-best regime.
The other view is that the formation of trading blocs is a sensible way of breaking down the
existing barriers and moving forward to a regime with significantly fewer barriers to trade (Lawrence,
'°  The so-called "Memorial Drive" school as identified by Bhagwati (1993, p. 29).1991). If countries  find it convenient  to group themselves  into blocs in order to reduce  any barriers
between  them, and if they  can do that  without  feeling  the need  to raise the barriers  between  blocs, then
that will be a net gain. And if, having  done that, they  can go on to accept  any new  members  who are
prepared  to abide  by the same  free trade rules as the existing  members  - where the new members  may
be previously  uncommitted  countries  or from other  blocs  - then  they  will necessarily  reach a far greater
degree  of free trade than they started  with.  If GATT is slow  moving,  then it is at least possible  that
creating  free trading  blocs and spreading  sideways  from there is preferable  to forcing  things  through
successive  GAIT-negotiating  rounds.  Such negotiations  are very complex and the benefits highly
contingent  because  the sanctions  on free-riders  and on those  who  make concessions  to special  interests
are not  usually  applied  and  may not even  be enforceable. On this view, regional  trading  arrangements
may  be compLementary  to GATT  (Lawrence,  1994).
11.3 How Does  the New  Trade Theory  Fit into This?
At this  point, it becomes  important  to examnne  why  regional  trading  blocs  form in the first  place.
Only  if we do that, do we have  a proper  yardstick  to judge  whether  groups  of economies  would  rationally
want to form a bloc; what they  could  expect  to achieve  by doing  so, and the likelihood  of them  actually
doing  so.  We can address  these questions  in two ways: using the new trade theory results "as is" -
effectively  a welfre approach,  given  the implicitpreferences  peopleuse. Or we can  look at the incentive
structure  of the different  trade policy  strategies  (a game  theory  or political-economy  approach)."
A Welfare  Approach
The theme  which  distinguishes  the new from  the traditional  trade theory is that  markets  are now
recognized  to be imperfectly  competitive  or to suffer  certain  domestic  distortions,  or to show  significant
scale  economies  in production  (Richardson,  1992). If the  problem  is simply  a domestic  price distortion,
then  the correct  remedy  would  be to correct  that distortion  and changes  in the trade regime  are  unlikely
to be an effective  way to addressthis  issue. So that  doesn't  help  us explain  regionaism. But f the issue
is scale economies  or imperfectly  competitive  markets then regionalism  can make sense because it
increases  market  size and reduces  average  costs  in the first case  and reduces  market  power  of individual
"  Those  two approaches  correspond  roughly  to Paul Krugman's  "narrow"  and "broad"  arguments
for free trade. See Krugman  (1993).9
firms  (and  hence  prices)  in the second' 2- provided  that a bloc-centric  industrial  policy  doesn'e  go 'long
with it, and provided  that the processes  of forming  a coalition  doesn't "close" the bloc at its external
boundary. In other words, "scale  economies  and oligopoly  Increase  the potential  gains from trade"
(Krugman  1989,  p. 361)  and  trading  blocs  provide  an effective  policy  regime  to explore  these  gains  (e.g.,
iough  intra-industry  specialization  and th. increase  of competition).3
Nevertheless,  there  ar  also some  traditional  arguments  which  might move  us towards  larger  but
more closed  blocs along  the lines of 'optimal tariff' reasoning. In imperfectly  compettive  markets,
market  power  allows "largeo  firms  to keep  prices above  costs. This plays  exacdy  the same role as an
opdmal  tariff which, by limiting  the volume  of trade, Sllows  "large' nations  to raise national  income.
Indeed  the optimal  tariff is a function  of the price elasticity  of foreign  import  demand  (Johnson,  1953).
Hence  monopoly  pricing  and  an optimal  tariff  are equivalent  if we leave  aside  their  redistribution  effects.
On the other hand, gains  made  by one player  will come  at the expense  of others in the market,  which
immediately  invites  retaliation. That in turn will leave  the players  worse  off on average,  even  if one of
them is individually  better  off.
From this perspective,  it's more attractive  to seek a larger market  in which  you retain  a degree
of market  power,  and  then  mairta  an external  tariff or its monopoly  pricing  equivalent.  That  may  invite
retaliation  from outside  the bloc,  but if the bloc  is more  closed  than  the original  economy,  this wil matter
less in terms of lost earnings  elsewhere.'  That would imply a net gain, providing  an indication  of
another  type  of incentive  for forming  blocs. Likewise,  a bloc  may be in a better position  to pursue  an
aggressive  industrial  policy  targeting  'high-retam' industries  and influencing  the world distribution  of
such industries  in its favor. Needless  to say, the capacity  of any trading bloc to effectively  pursue
'  Empirical  work  shows  that  growth  is correlated  negatively  with  market  power,  and  positively  with
productivity  growth. Both results  suggest  freer trade is better where  there are imperfectly  competitive
markets. See, for example,  Richardson  (1992).
'3  Note that  this does not change  the fact that  unilateral  liberalization  would  probably  be first-best
from a welfare  perspective.  The point  made  here is simply  that regionalism  may  be welfare-improving
*  as compared  to the pre-integration  status quo of trade  barriers, and  that  scale  economies  and  oFgopolies
tend  to strengthen  this result.
14 Reinforced  by the fact that  scope  for intervention  (by  tariff or by exercising  market  power)  fls
as spillovers  become  more diffuse  or more equal (since  retaliation  cancels  what you do).  So a trade
policy  of not cooperating  becomes  less destructive  with larger,  more  diverse  blocs.10
welfare-enhancing  "strategic"  trade policies or optimal-tariff  strategies  has not been established  in
practice.
A Game-Theoretic  Approach
The arguments  above offer a rationale  for forming  RIAs, but they depend  very much on the
advantages  which  accrue  to particular  agents  or sectors  in the prospective  blocs. That suggests  that rent
seeking  and special interest groups will have a special  role.  But it does not provide  a satisfactory
explanation  of across-the-board  moves to regional  trading arrangements  as illustrated  by the recent
proliferation  of regional  initiatives.
Secondly,  it is noticeable  how often  these  explanations  end up basing  themselves  on the benefits
of cooperative  behavior. Indeed,  we argue  that  free trade (or rather  the GAIT as its outward  and  visible
commiment,  or punishment,  mechanism)  is an explicidy  cooperative  regime.  In the case of large
producers, cooperation is going to produce the best approximation  to the Pareto optimality of free trade
when  producers  are large in size but small in number. That would  be a welfare-oriented  approach  too.
But to get regionalism  into that story we have  to look  at the political  economy  aspects  in more  detail, to
find  out  why  the intended  cooperation  might  break  down, and  why  players  might  get "diverted"  from any
tedency to regress  back  to a regime  of ordinary  unilateral  noncooperative  policies  to form RIAs  - i.e.,
coalitions  - instead. That we do in section Ell.
Meanwhile  we can start  by observing  that, when the number  of producers/decision  makers  (n)
is large - so that individually  they have no incentive  to respond to one another - and when the decision
makers all have exactly  the same objectives  such as maximmng earnings, profits or  utility, then
noncooperative  decision  making  will nevertheless  produce  socially  (i.e., Pareto)  optimal  outcomes. In
other  words, under  the usual assumptions  of perfecdy  competitive  product  and factor markets,  "small"
agents,  and  full information,  the individual  and noncooperative-decision  making  of a free trade regime
will be first-best  optimal."
I  The proof is based on an optimal  control  version  of a dynamic  game  where  n tends  to infinity  in
the solution. See Hughes  Hallett  and Rees (1983).11
But  the crucial  point is that, by using  exactly  the same  framework,  you  find that as n gets small
and the players  become  large (so they respond  to each  others actions  in different  ways), or when  their
objectives  differ 16, then  only cooperation  will maintain  those  Pareto optimal  outcomes  and the problem
has a core  of solutions  which  strictly  dominates  all others  with  noncooperation  in them. Thus cooperative
decision  making  actually  reproduces  all the  desirable  welfare  features  that  free trade  would  have  generated
(strict  perfect  competition  excepted).
There are therefore  two options here.  We must either create a trade policy regime which
generates  cooperation  explicitly  (i.e., a 'perfect' GAIT system). Or  we must  create  one which  simulates
the mechanisms  that produce  the gains  which  we would  have obtained  from an explicitly  cooperative
framework. But what might those mechanisms  be?  There are several  possibilities:  a reallocation  of
decisions  to exploit a wider 'portfolio" of comparative  advantage  characteristics  as far as possible;
sequencing  those decisions best (i.e.,  specializing  to  exploit comparative  advantage over time);
reducinglinternalizing  externalities  by "trading  off" policy interventions  between players; and improving
domestic  policy  effectiveness  by reducing  spillovers  (i.e., creating  scale economies  in interventions).' 7
One way to implement  this-at  least in theory-would  be to have  RlAs  constrcted as a sequence  of
expanding mini-GAITs leading to a worldwide "nerfect" GAIT.
These  are  exacdy  the desirable  characteristics  of the  policy  regime  which  Paul  Krugman  associates
with the new trade  theory,  with all its attention  to market  structure  and oligopolistic  behavior  (Krugmn
1987, 1993). He argues  that  strict free trade (as conventionally  defined)  is no longer  first-best  optimal.
However, something  very like it will be - specifically  a regime  with these cooperative  characteristics
which  rule out  the  predictable  excesses  of noncooperative  behavior. Hence  holding  to a conventional  free
trade regime  won't involve  much  loss.
The crucial  distinction  here is that cooperation  is needed  to secure free market access  for the
existing producers, whether they are perfectly competitive  or  not.  Free trade as  conventionally
16 Their objectives  may  differ  because  they  face  different  structures  in their input  or product  marklets
for example;  or because  both prod-ucers  and consumers  are t;wolhed  in the game.
17 The proposition  that cooperation  improves  policy effectiveness,  as well as its other potential
benefits,  are laid out in Cooper  (1969)  and  Hughes  Hallett  (1986). Policy  effectiveness  can be equated
with scale  economies  to the extent  that it implies  that the incremental  gains  in the achievement  of policy
targets  per unit change  in the instruments  are larger under cooperation.12
understood will require something more since the existing market structures (which may entail market
power for some producers) will not always support perfect competition. It is not clear that, by imposing
the rules of strict free trade when "n" is in fact small, we will actually impose only small losses on the
players individually  (as opposed to on average).  Strictly speaking, this is the wrong approach anyway
since you can always compute the Pareto optimal cooperative solution explicitly in any given case.
However that objection may not matter much in practice since if markets are not fully competitive you
cannot impose those free trade rules without either extensive regulation (which you can't do because
there's no international law to enforce that regulation), or without extensive and carefilly coordinated
interventions  to rig pricestsupplies  to generate free trade outcoihes  out of imperfecty competitive  markets
(which you can't do because it's not incentive compatible since, by construction, free trade is less than
Pareto optimal in this case).  So what you actually have to do is to reinvent a GATr-type  free trade
stucture  by which governments pledge to use their own national regulation systems to produce the first
outcome.  Or you have to invent a series of explicit negotiating frameworks capable of forcing the
cooperative trade policies you need (to give the second outcome).  That is usually most easily done with
your nearest trading partners, leading to the formation of regional trading blocs.
This reformulation of Krugman's broad, or political economy arguments  for 'free trade," doesn't
produce free trade as such, but a cooperative multilateral trading regime.  That is certainly consistent
with, and could possibly be  achieved through,  a system of mini-GATT arrangements for groups of
economies. It is also a result which does not depend on an appeal to the informally defined second-best
approximations  used in Krugman's arguments.  Nevertheless, we can see thit  one crucial element is
missing. There is nothing in this view of the world which ensures that the distibution  of the benefits will
be either incentive compatible for all, or acceptable in the sense of reflecting their (perceived) market
power.  So the outcomes could well tur  out to be contestable, either to the participating countries or to
the private sector interests within them. -Why, for instance, would the players want to commit to this
open (and expanding) regime of mini-GATs  if neither free trade rules nor explicit cooperation favor
them as much as being able to use their market power, either individually  or as a member of a coalition?
The point here is to draw a distinction  between a multilateral cooperative regime which guarantees free
market access  to a small or large number  of producers, and a free-trade/perfect-competition  regime where
there are only large numbers of producers so that prices settle at marginal costs.13
m.  GAIT  AND RIAs
At this stage, it is worth  asking  why countries  have found it so difficult  to go right dirough  to
global  cooperative  solutions?  Is it because  they find  it hard to commit  themselves  to regimes  where  there
are few effective  sanctions  against  those  who  try to free ride? It may well  be that regional  blocs  work
better as pre-commitnent  devices  because  they are seen to lock in favorable  tading practices  between
close  partners  to a degree  not  possible  in a global  scheme;  because  the losses  for a player  disciplined  or
ostracized  from his bloc are more immediate  and tangible;  and  because  a smaller  bloc can more easily
create  a network  of interlocking  economic  benefits,  beyond  just tading arrangements,  such  that  reneging
on the latter  can trigger  sanctions  which  deny  the "sinner"  the other  benefits  as well.
We start  our analysis  by focussing  on the  problems  of the GATr system  as a commitment  device.
After  that  we look at inter-bloc  trade relations  (and  related  institutions)  and  to what extent  regional  blocs
can be used  as "building"  blocs  towards  a new global  cooperative  regime.
11.1 The GAIT System
The GAiT system  (which  in the near future  will become  part of the World  Trade Organization)
amounts  to a commitment  to a cooperative  regime in which there is limited advantage  in unilateral
liberalization  - but the advantages  of multilateral  liberalization  accrue  to all only so long as all 'play the
game." The  threat  of discimination  against  those  who  broke  ranks,  in particular  more  difficult  conditions
of access  to the large  US market,  sustained  this process  of liberalization  for many  years. But, like any
cooperative  regime, there is in fact often little sanction against  individuals  who revert to their best
noncooperative  policies  - and quite  possibly  none at all against  those  who form a coalition  with market
power.
First, participants  may  judge retaliation  to be uncertain,  unreliable,  and costly  for the injured
partyqes). Second,  countries  may  be reluctant  to incur  the costs  of retaliation  against  dissidents  whose
unilateral  actions  do not affect  them much.  Similarly,  those who would  be left at a disadvantage  by
unilateral  action  else-here will be reluctant  to cooperate  with those  who, in their own interest,  fail (or
have  failed)  to play the game. That in itself  will start  to sort countries  out into coalitions  of like-minded
partners, and  once there are two or more  larger "players"  in operation  the pressure  for freer trade will
fade, since the cowlpetitive  offering of access to the coalitions' markets will secure much of the14
cooperative  benefits  for most  of the  participants,  while  reciprocal  discriminatory  trade  policies  will  ensure
that free trade in a wider  sense  is always  denied  to some  group(s). Indeed  it is quite  possible  that some
coalitions  will form which  can secure greater benefits  for its members  than would  have been possible
under  full cooperation,  but at the cost of worse  outcomes  for those  outside. Those outsiders  may  then
form a coalition  in self-defence.
These last remarks  reveal an important  reason why the GATT system wi1l  continue  to face
challenges  in the post-Uruguay  Round  world.  Once countries  have made the calculation  that their
interests  are better  served  by making  free trade arrangements  with  their immediate  trade partners  and  by
allowing  more  noncooperative  policies  guide  their  relations  with  non-members,  they  would  only  g  move
towards  a system  of regional  blocs if the sanctions  that could  be levied  against  them  within the GATE
system  itself, or in retaliation  by other (execluded)  governments,  were sufficiently  powerful.
History  shows  that  GATT-sanctioned  retaliations  arethe exception  rather than  the rule. Actually,
the only example  of GAIT authorized  retaliation  was issued  in 1952,  as the result  of a complaint  by the
Netherlands  against  GATr-illegal  barriers  imposed  by the United  States  upon dairy products."' More
recent  requests  for retaliatory  authority  (by  the EC and Canada  against  the United  States  in 1988-89)  have
been  blocked  by the defendant  country. This should  not come as a surprise  given  the fact that GATr's
dispute  setuement  procedures  (as everything  else in GATI)  operate  under  a consensus  rule (Hudec,  1990,
p.  184).
As argued by Finger (1988, p.  13), the "GAIT-founding  fathers' most likely had as their
objective  to minimize  the probability  of GAIT-authorized  trade sanctions. In this context, GAT's
dispute-settlement  mechanism  was framed  to foster  consultations  among  the involved  parties  and  to work
mainly  through  moral  suasion  (peer  pressure). The threat of trade retaliation  was, of course,  there, but
as history  has shown  its implementation  is, to say the least, unlikely. If one adds to this the failure  of
Article  XXIV  to effectively  discipline  the formation  of blocs, the potential  for non-cooperative  behavior
among  trade blocs  becomes  evident.
'  It is worth  noting  that neither  did  the Netherlands  act on this authorization  to retaliate,  nor did  the
United  States  change  its trade practice. See  Jackson  (1989,  p. 96).15
Moreover,  GAlT's effectiveness  is fiuther  complicated  by the fact  that many  trade restrictions
which  are now commonly  used do not properly  fall under the disciplines  of the GAiT treaty.  This
allows  governments  to maintain  a reasonably  GAIT-consistent  face to the world while  or°ating policy
instruments  which  have a  protectionist  impact  in practice. Administered  protection  (anti-dumping  and
countervailing  duties)  or "voluntary'  export  restraints,  for example,  can be targeted  rather precisely  to
thwart  foreign  competitors.  But their redistributive  effects  (via rent tranfers) are non-transparent  both
inside  and  outside  the country  imposing  the trade restriction.
Against  this background,  it seems clear that countries  with their own interests  in bloc-wise
noncooperative  behavior  could  easily  find  ways  of doing  so without  apparently  violating  GATr disciplines
(e.g., through  anti-dumping  actions  that discriminate  against firms of non-member  countries). Once
counties realize  that is the case,  the most powerful  reason  for wanting  to form free trade  blocks  within
the GATT  system  becomes  apparent. It is a defensive  move, since  there is no other  way that countries
can credibly  commit  to behave  in a properly  cooperative  manner  within GAIT.1'9 It is therefore  better
to withdraw  into a smaller  coalition  of your immiediate  partners  where an explicit  agreement  (and the
implicit threat of expulsion and loss of market access in general, rather of access to particular markets)
can "lock  in" liberal  trading  policies  and market  access  where it matters. Unfortuately, the very need
to make such  an arrangement  sustinable, jd  the commitments  or sanctions  credible,  suggests  that the
bloc might  well  turn into a "closed"  trading  arrangement.
The successful  conclusion  of the Uruguay  Round  in December  1993  indicates  that  the multilateral
system  is trying  to respond  to these  challenges-  The Uruguay  Round  extended  and  deepened  the network
of variables  covered  by multilateral  rules. -'This  can be interpreted  as an attempt  to generate  sufficient
incentives  and  potential  sanctions  to sustain  the multilateral  trading  regime. In any  case, one  might  argue
as we do that even  with strong  regional  blocks,  the GAIT (or the future  World  Trade Organiation)  will
stil be needed  as a means of preventing  backsliding,  of handling  trade disputes  (particularly,  among
blocs), and of extendi:! the scope of the multilateral  rules to ensure that incentives  for multilatera
cooperation  do not disappear  with  the growing  importance  of RIAs. An important  area  of research  would
be to see  how that  might be done. But all of this depends  on GATT  maintning effective  and credible
dispute/sanctions  procedures.
19 A similar  point is made in Hindley  and Messerlin  (1993).16
The Dispute  Settlement  Understanding  of the Uruguay  Round will improve  the ability  of the
GAIT to adopt  panel reports against countries  that infringe  multilateral  disciplines. In the past, the
consensus  rule often  impeded  the implementation  of the findings  of a dispute  settlement  panel  (since  the
aguilrty  contracting  party could  block  the adoption  of the panel's results). Under  the new  rules, unless
all contracting  parties  agree not  to adopt  ihe results  of the panel,  they will be adopted  within  60 days  of
the release  of the report. This is in principle  an important  improvement  in terms of GAT's  institutional
capacity  to discipline  "GATr-illegal"  behavior. Yet, given  the problems  of punishing  non-cooperative
behavior  at a multilateral  level  in a timely  fashion,  this  institutional  improvement  will not  erase  the appeal
of RIAs  as pre-commitment  devices,  as argued  below.
M.2  On Credible  Ccmaninents  to a Regime  and  Institutional  Reform
Is there anything  intrinsic  to RIAs  that  make  them work  better as pre-commitment  devices  than
a global  regime  such as the GAIT system? Is there any reason  to suppose  that the participants  would
want to commit  in some absolute  sense even to a regional  cooperative  arrangement? There are two
arguments  here:  first with respect  to the "absolute'  incentive  to commit  to any  cooperative  regime  (glcbal
or regional),  and second  to show  the relative  ease of making  credible  commitment  within a system  of
(smaller)  regional  blocs.  Those are important  arguments  because  they highlight  a fundamental  issue:
whether  a regime  of regional  blocs  would  be sustainable  in the long term.
The usu.I justification  for expecting  commitment  to any  regime  is that if you cheat  and get away
with  it the gains  are only small  (convex  "losses' towards  the private  optimum). But  it is open  to anyone
who  fears that such a lack of commitment  to the new regine would  damage  them significantly  to cheat
back, and  that  would  impose  larger losses  on you since  it involves  convex  losses  away  from your  private
optimum.? Since  in a continuing  game  those  threatened  losses  would  be larger  than the potenal gains,
it is clear  that you  would  be better  off  by committing  to the rules of the regime  and  not cheating. That's
one  version  of why  cooperative  trade  policies  would  be sustainable:  punishment  losses  will outweigh  the
temptation  gains. Indeed,  triggering  a trade war would  push  both players  off their contract  curve  and
2  A property  of Pareto optimality  when  the other  players  gain. What is more, cheating  back can
be done at anytime  (preemptively,  simultaneously,  or retrospectively)  and by anyone (mdividuals  or
coalitions).  Bond  and  Syropoulos  (1992,  1993)  have  different  results,  but they are dealing  with cheating
between  blocs, in the cases  where  such  blocs  already  exist. Here we are talking of commitment  within
blocs, where  market  power  is not an issue.17
(if they are of similar  size) leave  them both worse off and therefore  persuade  them to commit  to the
cooperative/free  trade  solution. But  this result  will be fragile  if a bloc  has significant  market  power  (see
section  M.3); you  may  have  to make  blocs  of a similar  size, and  maintain  something  of a closed  structure
to maintain  credible  punishment  options  should  someone  cheat, in order  to sustain  it.  Altogether  that
makes  free trade  hard to maintain  - particularly  if one  of the blocs  is large enough  and the transgression
principally  affects  the more remote  trading  partners, or where  retaliation  has uncertain  impacts. The
difficulty  which the authors of the GAIT  system had in getting agreement on the principle that
participants  should  be able and willing  to take collective  and effective  action  against  signatories  who
violate  the agreement's  provisions,  illustrates  the significance  of this qualification.
The  sustainability  of cooperative  trading  arrangements  may  therefore  depend  on  whether  countries
find it easier  to commit  to regional  blocs  than  to a global  regime. A system  of regional  blocs,  in which
each  player  maintains  several  different  targets  simultaneously,  not  only  focusses  the commitment  problem
on the costs  for (and  retaliation  from)  one's immediate  partners.  It also  allows  us to replace  the individual
targets  of more remote  partners  in one arena  with  a wider range  of targets  for the immediate  partners  in
various  different  arenas. It is the latter point which  matters  here.  The need for cooperation  is more
apparent  because  to get the additional  gains  in efficiency  we have to be able to negotiate  a trade off
between  an improvement  in the target of one player  in one arena against  that in the target  of another
player  in another  arena. This  we do by playing  out  the implied  simultaneous  game. That is the attraction
of deepening  instead  of widening. Moreover  the costs of cheating  and retaliation  will also be clearer
since  the former  will show  up in all of a player's  targets, and  retaliation  can be undertaken  by any of a
player's instrument  variables. In addition,  since  we are now  dealing  with a self-supporting  coalition  of
players,  punishments  will be exacted  by a larger  numbers  of players  (who  want  to pursue  all the interests
of the bloc)  rather than  just the parties  injured  by one target  failure.
There are many  examples  where  the formation  of regional  blocs  has naturaRy  led to a network
of linked targets between members, in place of one set of  similar targets across nonmembers.
Eichengreen  and Frieden (1993)  refer to the European  Monetary  Union (EMU)  deal as bargaining
between  members  which  involves  implicit  or explicit  links between  EMU and other issues.  Garrett
(1993)  highlights  the case of Germany  becausc  the Germans  fmd EMU relatively  unattractive,  but go
along  with  it in order  to secure  other  goals  such  as the acceptance  of German  reunification  within  the EC,
or achieving  increased  exports  to the  rest of the  BC. What  of course  is happening  is that coercion,  where
a country's  interests  might be marginal  or negative,  Is  being substituted  by gains  in that country's  other18
targets  to maintain  the necessary  incentives.
Forming a regional bloc implies new or revised institutions and it is the ability to design new
institutions  which  take a whole  range  of issues  under  the competence  of one regulatory  body  which  make
countries  more  prepared-to  commit  themselves  to regional  blocs.  That in fact  is a special  case  of a more
general  proposition  (Martin,  1993;  Cohen, 1993). Institutions,  in this case  the newly  designed  regional
ones, will pllay  a powerful role by changing the incentives  that countries face.  Consequendy making a
denser  network  which  binds  policy  linkages  together,  and  by shrinking  cooperaion  onto  a larger number
of variables  affecting  a smaller  number  of countries,  makes  the bloc b2t more  attractive  because  where
there are potential  losses  there are now more issues  at stake  with which  to make side-payments  (more
"quids"  per "quo"),  gad more  robuist  Oecause  there  exists  a greater  need  to exact  punishment  to redress
the losses  per transgression).  That is why countries  might  be prepared  to commit  to regional  (but not
global)  cooperation.21  Sustainability  therefore  is attained  whenever  blocs  can provide  the instiutuional
backing necessary  to  deter independent  governments  from breaking bargains.that turn out to  be
inconvenient  in some  respect.
111.3  Is the Proliffeation  of RIAs  Consistent  with a Move  to Global  Free Trade?
Recent  anaytical work  has focused  on modelling  the interactions  between  blocs in more detail;
specifically  on how the prospects  for free trade between  blocs fare, and bow the welfare  of the blocs
themseves  -varies, as bloc sizes increase  or become  more  asymmetric. These results  are important  for
our arguments  because  they  illustrate  some  of the incentives  for forming,  then expanding  or deepening
the cooperation  within a bloc; also for what is likely  to happen  in terms of free trade, cooperation  or
continued  barriers  between  blocs. That  is important  because  by tracking  the  welfare  gains  of the  different
players  under  the different  regimes  or bloc  patterns  we can say something  about  -where  the present  trend
to regionalism  is likely  to end up; and to evaluate  the argument  that progressing  trough  a sequence  of
mini-GAITs  of increasing  size  is an easier  or more  effective  way  of reaching  a full free trade  regime  than
atempting  to broaden  out  the present  GAIT system  with its lack  of credible  enforcement  or commitment
mechanisms.
2  Lawrence  (1994)  makes  the same  point. Of course  this advanage  is likely  to come  at the expense
of outsiders  - a denser network  of targets created  to underwrite  the interests  of members  typically
marginalize  those  of-nonmembers.19
A convenient  starting point for an analysis  of this problem is die contribution  offered by Kemp
and Wan (1976). Kemp and Wan demonstrated  that, in a completely  unrestricted world (i.e., competitive
trade between any number of countries in any number of goods and where tariffs, export taxes, etc are
permitted), a subset of those countries can always form a customs union with a common external tariff
structure and a system of internal side-payments  such that everyone (whether a member of that union or
not) is no worse off - and in general better off - than before the formation of that union.  This result
is important  because it illustrates  that a move to regionalism Cm  the guise of customs unions) can be seen
as a move towards global free trade (Lawrence, 1994); In other words, progressing through a sequence
of mini-GATT blocs (new RIAs being formed or, more likely, old ones being enlarged at each stage) is
indeed an alternative and perhaps easier way of creating a system-wide  cooperative free trade regime, as
intended by the authors of GATI.
But notice two crucial qualifications. First a system of side-ayments  within the union is typically
needed to get the result that everyone is mnde better off.  That can only be fixed by explicit cooperation
within each union.  Hence the progression to a full cooperative regime through a sequence of mini-
GAITs  can only be achieved in  general with explicit intra-bloc cooperation.  If for any reason the
incentives  for that cooperation  were to fail, including when creadng the final worldwide bloc, then this
strategy of creating free trade outcomes via a sequence of free trade blocs would become infeasible.
Second, this desirable equilibrinum  is not going to be unique. In particular there is no assumption
that each player will have maximized  their own interests in making each step through to the fudl  free trade
regime.  it is also perfectly  possible, indeed highly likely, that some of them could combine into a union
which, by exerting market power at the expense of weaker or unorganized nonmembers, could produce
greater gains for its members than were available either before that union or under worldwide free
trade.  And if that is the case, then, there will come a stage in the progression through mini-GAITs
to full free trade, where no defensive coalition  can prevent the larger customs union to appropriate those
gains for itself and the movement  towards a free trade regime will simply stop.  Unless, of course, there
are sufficient  non-economic  losses, or sanctions  imposed  by some global institution  or hegemon interested
in world as opposed to private welfare, which offset the incentives to form such a blocldng customs
union. -
M  This situation is highly likely because otherwise it would not be necessary to offer side-payments
each time new entrants (at least at the final stage)  joined the existing union.20
That outcome  seems likely  because  the Kemp  and Wan proof depends  on nonmembers'  trade
being  fixed at its pre-union  level at each  step, so that nonmembers  suffer no trade diversion  as a result
of the union. If trade  barriers within  the union  then  fall, there will be trade creation  in the union  but no
diversion  outside. A Pareto improvement  versus  the status quo ante.  In fact, greater  trade within  the
union  means  high incomes  and hence  some  spillover  of extra demand  for nonmembers  at the preexisting
interbloc  trade  levels. All  players  actually  gain  therefore,  provided  side-payments  within  the union  ensure
a net gain  for all members  as the internal  barriers  come  down.
But this is only one possible  construction  of the gains  from fbrming  or extending  a union, and
as such it is not necessarily  the self-maximizing  construction.  Greater  gains  (for the union  as a whole)
will typically  emerge  when  the constraint  that nonmembers  trade must remain  fixed at its previous  level
is removed,  and  the union  is free to maximize  its collective  revenue. Exploiting  market  power  like  that
tends  tD  raise  union  prices and  tariffs (offsetting  any tendency  for prices to fall internally)  at the expense
of nonmembers  who now lose out because  of interbloc  trade diversion  without  any compensating  side
payments. But  side-payments  to nw  members  will also  typically  be necessary  to ensure  that they  share
in some  of the gains  relative  to what they could  have achieved  outside  the union. At the last stage of
enlarging  blocs  to a single  free-trade  bloc, a union  (with  market  power at the penultimate  stage)  would
lose  those  remaining  interbloc  tariffls  which,  sustained  by that market  power,  were generating  the  union's
excess  gains over cooperation/free  trade.  Self-interest  would therefore  prevent such a union going
through  to the last stage.
Krugman's  (1991a)  "Is bilateralism  bad?" paper provides  an alternative  insight  on the prospects
for global  free trade when blocs  fbrm and/or become  bigger in size and  maximize  their own interests.
Krugman  assumes  full cooperation  (free trade) within each bloc, but no cooperation  (optimal  tariffs)
between  blocs,  and allows  the size of each  bloc to dictate  market  power  in raising  those  (external)  tariffs
in a single-shot  game. In this game  all countries  are identical  but each  produces  a different  good,  so that
there  are  no comparative  advantages.  Krugman  then  shows  that individual  welfare  increases  (slowly)  with
bloc  size. But small  inter-bloc  tariff; generate  significant  trade diversion  so that  world  welfare  decreases
more  sharply  with  bloc size  until  there  are  just three  blocs,  and then  increases  rapidly  to its first best  level
at free trade (a single  bloc). That in ikzM  is a warning  of what-  may  happen,  but the underlying  model
is a highly specialized  one and the results  may not be so robust.21
Bond  and Syropoulos  (1992, 1993)  have, in a series  of papers,  given  a different  picture  of what
happens  as the blocs grow in size.  They first allow each country  to have comparative  advantage  in
producing  one good  and the same advantage  in producing  all the others. They also allow  the interbloc
tariffs  to be set from a repeated  game; if the implicitly  cooperative  behavior  thus generated  is violated,
the punishment  strategies  triggered  are a single  period  noncooperative  tariff  game  before  cooperation  can
be reestablished.
Bloc  size can then  be varied  in two ways. First equal sized  blocs  are formed  and their number
reduced. That means  within  bloc  trade rises  but the relative  bloc sizes remain  constant. It also means
the share  of "home"  consumption  in total output  rises, so that each bloc's (absolute)  market  power  rises
as well  as the  optimal  tariff if noncooperative  interbloc  behavior  is triggered. In this case,  increasing  bloc
size has two effects:  (i) it increases  the welfare  gain  which  one bloc can make by defecting  from free
trade to maximize  its private  interests  (since  larger  blocs have  greater  market  power  vs. the rest of the
world);  but (ii)  larger blocs  means  that  the welfare  level  reached  in the noncooperative  punishment  phase
which  follows  is lower  (because  noncooperation  with  larger blocs  means  their own  policies  become  less
sefective  - which  is Cooper's  (1969)  standard  result). Thus  the incentives  to cheat  go up, but so does
the punishment  for cheating,  which  leaves  it ambiguous  whether  the incentive  to go noncooperative  rises
or fills with bloc size.  Bond and Syropoulos,  however, show  by simulation  that the cheating  gains
always  dominate  in their  model,  so free trade becomes  harder to sustain  with larger  blocs.
Second  one can fix the bloc size  for a given  numbers  of blocs,  and then increase  the size of the
first one  to see  the effects  of increasing  relative  (rather  than absolute)  bloc  size. Asymmetry  presents  the
larger  bloc  with increased  incentives  (greater  market  power)  to cheat  relative  even  to the increasing  costs
from the subsequent  retaliation  and punishment. In other words, inter-bloc  cooperation  becomes  even
more  difficult  with asymmetric  blocs.
These two results are,  like Krugman's, derived from a  particular model of production,
consumption  and trading  patterns  between  blocs.  So the question  of the robustness  of the results to
alternative  specifications  naturally  arises. However,  Bond and  Syropoulos  are able to demonstrate  that
they  hold  firm  with  increasing  degrees  of comparative  advantage  and  ncreasing  degrees  of risk aversion
Ci.e.,  curvature  in the countrylbloc  welfare  functions). In fact, as one might expect,  increasing  risk
aversion  makes it harder  to support free trade as blocs fear cheating  more and hence raise their
evaluation  of the gains  to be made from cheating  on free trade by more than they would  raise their22
evaluation  of the punishment  costs. Hence  the former  dominates  the latter  by even  more and  it becomes
harder  to support  free  trade since  everyone  perceives  larger  downside  risks/costs  from defecting.  Raising
the degree of comparative  advantage,  however,  has the-opposite  effect; it makes free trade easier to
support, but not by enough  to overturn  any of the existing  results. Comparative  advantage  evidently
increases  the private  gains  which  a bloc  can  capture  by increasing  its size  and behaving  noncooperatively.
It also has the effect  of decreasing  the welfare  attained  under  the noncooperative  (punishment)  phase,  so
the costs  of defecting  from  free trade  are greater  because  less  effective  policies  - or more  offset  between
them  - mean  that  tariffs  have  to be used  harder  to try to capture  those  large private  gains. Of these  two,
the effect on punishment  costs is larger, so that free trade becomes  relatively  easier to support  with
stronger comparative  advantages  - but not by enough to remove the incentve for blocs to follow
competitive  trade polices.
These  results  suggest  that  once  trading  blocs  become  of significant  size it is increasingly  unlikely
that the world could maintain  a cooperative  (free trade) regime  between them.  That implies  losses
compared  to a full free trade regime,  although  it is an open question  as to whether  that kind of loss is
large or not.  It can be argued  that, compared  to the gains  from free trade within  each  bloc, those  losses
would  not be [urge  - but we know  of no serious  empirical  (or theoretical)  evidence  to back  that claim
up in practice. Yet, as mentioned  in Krugman  (199Ib), even if global  welfare losses are not serious,
individual  countries  left behind  could  be significantly  affected.
The process  of forming  and enlarging  blocs  would  not lead  to a 'single bloc"  free trade regime
unless  the presence  of those  losses,  and  the fact  that it is a repeated  game,  persuades  the remaimnig  blocs
of the advantages  of, and each  players  eventual  commitment  to, interbloc  cooperation.  But  for that even
to be possible  (ignoring  for the moment  that, given  the earlier  results,  it would  probably  not be possible
to persuade  participants  that  these  large  blocs  would  ever  commit  to interbloc  cooperation),  the gains  from
interbloc cooperation  have to remain positive as blocs increase in size but each bloc contines to
maximize  its own 'private' welfare.
Bond  and Syropoulos  (1993)  in fact show  that as one  bloc  gets larger, not  only do its gains  from
dwecting  from  free trade  yield  higher  welfare,  but its welfare,  given  noncooperative  behavior  with  respect
to the rest of the world (having  defected),  is also higher. At that point  one of the blocs has become  a
dominating  coalition  which  cannot  be blocked  by the rest  of the world;  with  market  power  it can  do better
as a coalition  than in a free trade regime,  but at  the cost of the rest of  the  world. So r x  only do large23
blocs  have  a incentive  to defect  from free trade in the sense  that  they gain  more from cheating  than  they
lose from noncooperation  subsequently;  they may  even  gain  from noncooperation  itself if they  are large
enough.
In subsequent  work, Bond and others (1993)  showed  that this result continues  to hold even if
several  smaller  blocs  attempt  to form a blocking  coalition  against  a sufficiently  large  dominating  coalition.
Hee  free trade  achieved  through  a sequence  of mini-GATTs  is not a feasible  strategy,  even  if a credible
commitment  mechanism  were created  (and guaranteed)  through  some  multilateral  agency  able  to impose
sufficient  penalties  on those  who  try to violate  the agreed  free trade or market  access  rules.
The only ways out of that difficulty  are if: (a) the dominant  bloc can be persuaded  through
altruism, or because  other (noneconmic)  interests  would otherwise  be forfeit, to play cooperatively
through  to the end despite  the incentive  to do otherwise  (for example,  it can be argued  that the United
States did this in the post-war  period  because  it had ideological  and security  concerns  which  led it to
preserve  free trade policies  in the West through  GA2T, rather than  push its own  economic  interests  as
it could  have done);  or (b) if the blocs  themselves  link up a network  of other issues  to free trade, such
that if the latter  were to fail the other issues  (on some  of which  the economically  dominant  coalition  is
not  dominant)  would  be dealt  with  noncooperatively  to the cost  of the dominant  bloc; or (c)  if the smaller
blocs, realizing  the potential  cost of being dominated  in this sense, make it their policy  to maintin a
blocking  coalition  of sufficient  size before  the larger blocs  get to the stage  of excluding  them (but it is
not clear why they would  not try to join the larger bloc's bandwagon  first.); or (d) the smaller  blocs
lobby  for a multilateral  agency  with blocking  powers;  or (e) the smaller  countries  form a coalition  in a
specific  sector  where  they  have  market  power  (e.g. in certain  commodity  markets). In any of these  cases,
the larger bloc  would  cooperate;  otherwise  not.
IV.  PROTECTIONISM  AND  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY  OF REGIONAUISM
To understand  the  process  of regional  integration  we  have  contrasted  multilateralism  (cooperation)
with protectionism  (noncooperation)  and regionalism  (coalitions).  In order to uncover  the mechanisms
23  All the results  in this section  are derived  using  tariffs  as the instrument  of trade  policy. But  to
the extent  that other instruments  (quotas,  export  restraints,  nontariffs  barriers)  can be written  in terms
of their  tariff  equivalents  by calculating  their impacts  in raising  prices  at the border, these  results  can be
generalized.24
which make  regional coalitions  relatively attractive,  we argued  that there is a natural tendency  to "close"
the coalition  at its boundaries  (or to deepen  it) in order to maintain  incentive  compatibility  and maimie
the local gains, and to maintain  the credibility  of the commitment  to free trade.  That has to do with the
coalition's market  power. But as we noted at the start, a second possibility  is that political pressure from
special interest groups wUll  produce a similar outcome  by distorting trade policy to suit their particular
industries. The importance  of special interest in this connection  was already apparent in the incentives
tu  closew  the bloc at its external  borders, in the trade-off  between  the gains in some industries and losses
in others, and in the need to provide insurance against  the bloc breaking down.  This section therefore
considers  how special interests would influence  the formation  and the policies  of regional arrangements.
We have to recognize  that, while  governments  try to improve  the welfare  of their electorates,  they
are not immune  to political pressure and offers of support from special interest groups. Moreover those
interest  groups will interact  strategically  with their governments  - and between  themselves  because  their
interests  wiM  necessarily  clash internationally  and domestically  since  greater assistance  to any particular
special interest would (ceteris panbus) cut into general welfare and cause governments  to limit the total
amount of assistance  on offer.  Other special interest groups would then suffer.
On the other hand, a regional arrangement  carries the potential for diluting  the interest groups'
impact  and hence for improving  wel&re; the larger the association,  the less sensitive  is policy to privmate
interests which do not coincide with general welfare.  But whether that actually happens or not also
depends on how the interest groups interact (i.e., whether  they cooperate  too); on how the govermnents
interact (competition  may dilute their policies, and make them more dependent  on political support); on
what the extemal policies are;  on the differences in preferences and policy effectiveness  between
governmeats and interest groups; and on the weight which governments give to satisfying special
interests.
To  determine the  final outcome, we have to  set the problem within a  framework which
incorporates strategic interactions between  special interests and governments, as well as between the
governmnts themselves;  that is a series of simultaneous  games. Unfortunately,  the literature has little
to say about  that  However, recent work by De Melo and vthas  (1993)  provides a simple model which
focuses on the interactions  between a single lobby for private sector interests and a single government.25
Two scenarios  are considered:  the case where the single government is a national government  acting in
isolation, and the case where that single government  is a regional institution  constructed  from an 'equal
shares" bargain between two national govermnents. There are therefore no strategic interactions, or
indeed  even spillovers,  between  the two countries  or between different interest groups; all the action is
between  the private sector lobby and the government  in queston, with a view to showing  the difference
in policy settings  when the latter is a regional institution  from when it is a ntional  government.
The burden of the results is to show that the dilution effect is always present, but will be offset
by asymmetries  in preferences  between the partners in the regional institution. So it is not clear, even
in this restricted  world, if regional  integration  would  make the participating  economies  better off, or that
the governments  themselves  would  feel better off and therefore  have an incentive  to integrate. On its own
the dilution effect would reduce the distorting influence  of the lobbies, implying an improvement  in
performance  (and efficiency)  in terms of the underlying  targets  of policy. On the other hand, if the aims
of policy (which must be interpreted  here as depending  on the relative priorities put on the underlying
targets, and on the relative ease of achieving  those targets) differ sufficiently  between counties, then
those improvements  in performance  will be offset to the point, eventually,  where one or both countries
wI  be worse off than without integration.
That is the basic insight, but there are other points.  First any  "institutional engineering' which
would control  the parameters  of these lobbying  policy-making  interactions  (i.e., the relative  priorities on
targets and political support; and the fact that the govemmenits  play follower,  without atempting to
influence  their lobbies  further, and appear  to ignore any policy ccnflicts  between  themselves  or between
lobbies) is more easily done when the regional institutions are being set up, rather than later.  The
question of institutional  design (or reform) is therefore crucial.  Second, it is easy to show that the
preference asymmetry effect becomes stronger the mare members the regional association contains,
making it progressively  more difficult  for each participant  to obtain a net improvement  in performance
on the strength  of the dilution effect  That explains  why the new regional groupings  typically have a
smaller number  of like-minded  members rather than the more diverse membership  of the global postwar
institutions. It tells us, in particular, that a series of minn-GATs may appear to be progressing while
GAIT itself appears to move.  only slowly.  Finally, the negative and possibly domilnc  pcveerence
asymmetry  effect natually implies  that getting convergence  will become  an objective  in tts own  right for26
the regional  institution,  but =  for the member  governments. The debates  over subsidiarity  (or
compliance)  reflect  that temsion.
Nevertheless,  one  must  recognize  that  the  decision  model  used  to derive  these  resuits  is extremely
restricted. By definition  none  of the decision  makers  are "small"  within  their regional  blocs. Hence
governments  (or pressure  groups)  will recognize  that their actions  have significant  spillovers  on their
counterparls  in other countries  and start  to act strategically  between  themselves  as well as between
pressure  groups  and between  governments.  Similarly,  when  governments  realize  that, by intervening,
they  alter  the  limits  of what  is  feasible  and  desirable,  they  will  want  to influence  what  the  pressure  groups
seek  to obtain  instead  of  just following  the lobbyists'  lead. Then  there  is the question  of what  happens
if interventions  may  be different  in different  parts of the integrated  bloc, or if different  governments
atach different  weights  to the importance  of the lobbyists  political  support,  or if the lobbyists  do not
benefit  equally  from a given  policy change  in their own economies?  On these matters  we have no
guidance,  but we can see  that  solving  the  simultaneous  games  set  out  in the Appendix  provides  a way  of
analyzing  them  in a framework  which  allows  any  kind  of asymmetries  in preferences  or structures,  and
any  kind  of strategic  behavior  between  goveruments  or between  governments  and  pressure  groups.
Using  an alternative  approach,  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1993a,  b) focus  on the  effects  of strategic
behavior  between  governments,  rather than on that between  pressure  groups  and governments. The
pressure  groups  seek to influence  government  policy  in their own favor with political  contributions.
Government  objectives  meanwhile  consist  of the economic  welfare  of their electorate,  and  the support
(contributions)  offered  by pressure  groups. One  can  then  show  how  optimal  tariffs  vary with  the size of
the contributions  and with the importance  (to the govermnent)  of those contrbutions  when there is
retaliation  (a tariff war); and  then the same  again  when  there  is negotiation  in the form of trade  tl,
both  cases  being  compared  to the case  where  governments  are immune  to political  pressure.
A munber  of interesting  results  emerge,  but again  the limits  on the interacons between  players
suggest  that  this  kind  of analysis  needs  to be placed  in the context  of simultaneus/overlapping  games  for
one to grasp  the real scope  of the results. For example,  the Grossman-Helpman  model  has the opti
tariffs  depending  on the uptimul  political  contributions  from  each  lobby,  where  the latter  are determined
takdng  that  dependence  into account  (i.e., a Stackelberg  equilibrium  with  the government  as follower).27
Having solved that part of the problem, domestic tariffs become a function of foreign tariffs and vice
versa.  So to solve the tariff game requires a Nash equilibrium between governments.  However, the
contribution  decisions  made by each lobby in the first stage are quite independent  of the spillover effects
they may have on any other lobby, domestic or foreign.  That means there are no interactions  between
lobbies, except indirectly, since the contributions  of any lobby will be a function of the expected  tariffs
which are themselves determined in response to other political contributions.  Hence there is a Nash
element to the final solution of the contribution  levels, but only through the agency of a third player:
government. That suggests an overlapping game formulation. That would certainly be appropriate  for
the cooperative  "trade talks" scenario. For the noncooperative  "trade war" case, it is a free-for-all; there
is no linkage through a single third party because governments  no longer cooperate.  A simultaneous
game formulation  would be the appropriate framework  for analyzing  that kind of problem, therefore.
To give an idea of the results, Grossmar,  and Helpmaii  show that, in the trade war case, import
tariffs and export subsidies will be higher (export taxes lower) when interest groups exert poliical
pressure on,  or make contributions to governments.  Moreover, that outcome is exaggerated if the
politicai contributions  become more important  and the immediate  concern  for general welfare is reduced.
In that case the import tariff for industry A (a net importer domestically)  will rise, while export subsidies
to industry A abroad also rise; protectionism  starts to rise between  blocs.
Meanwhile, other sectoral interests  in each economy  will also interact. What happens  to industry
B? If it too is an importer in the home country, it will expect the same solution. But it will also see that
the additional  pressure on the government  for assistance  would cut further into general welfare and cause
the government  to hold back on granting additional  tariffs or subsidies, given what industry A is already
obtaining, in order to preserve the optimal  mix of welfare and aggregate  protection. Thus, industry A's
contributions have a perceptible spillover onto industry B, and (in the absence of any adjustments  by
industry A) one would expect industry B to take account of that either by reducing the contributions  it
would have made in isolation  so that the average tarifflsubsidy provision (and hence industry B's share)
is maintained at a higher level (cooperation  between lobbies); or by increasing  its contributions in order
that a larger share of the then declining  average tariff/subsidy  provision comes its way (no cooperation
between  lobbies).  Meanwhile  industry A will be making exactly parallel calculations, so that they will
in fact reach an optimal noncooperative  equilibrium. Industry B's possible actions are therefore standard28
noncooperative  responses, and the strategy actually selected will depend  on whether reducing average
tariffs would  have  a bigger (positive)  impact  on general welfare, or whether  maintaining  them would  have
a larger (positive)  impact  on governments' evaluations  of their political support.
If however  industry  B is an exporter at home and an importer abroad,  the story (in isolation  from
industry A) would  be reversed. That might change  the results when industries  recognize  the spilovers
between them and the potental for retaliation. For instance, industry B's will realize that industry A's
import tariff winl  trigger a foreign tariff in retaliation. That will tend to increase industry B's pressure
for a yet larger export  subsidy. Again that could  be done by reducing  contributions  to maintain  a higher
average subsidy at home (since subsidies will be subject to a budget constrint  in aggregate), or by
increasing them to  attract a higher share of the available subsidies, depending on the contribution
multipliers  and their priority in government  objective  functions. But industry  A will be aware of that and
will wish to moderate  its own contributions  for the same reasons.  The net outcome of these changes is
not  easy to predict.  As in the previous case, we would have to  solve the simultaneous game in
contributions  and in tariffslsubsidies  to find out
It is particularly  important  to consider  sectoral interests, and the potential  conflicts  between  them,
since none of these stories explicitly  consider  the interests  of consumers  and those hurt by protectionism.
In general some interests will exert political pressure to get protection while others try to get it lifted.
That is the point of industry B playing the opposite role to  industry A.  Nevertheless in a general
noncooperative  set up, players will neglect  the response of their opponents, and any of these solutions
will result in an oversupply of contributions and hence of tariffs or subsidies.  Trade negotiations
(cooperation  between  the government  players, and hence the simultaneous  game version) would lead to
a lower level of protection. And that is what happens with potential welfare benefits being higher, the
stronger the political  imbalance  in the trade war case. If political  power is roughly equal between  groups
and countries, the negotiated  solution  reverts towards  free trade.
Hence, on the face of  it, an internally cooperative regional bloc is likely to  adopt a  less
protectionist  stance than the members  might have done in the trade war case, unless the special interest
groups  recognize  their own interdependence  or learn to cooperate,  or unless  the trade negotiations  involve
problems of incentive compatibility  which can be fixed by side-payments  generated through external29
tariffs, or unless the coalition indulges  in noncooperative  behavior with respect  to the rest of the world
in order to increase its 'market' share (as discussed  in section M.3).  In all those cases, a regional  bloc
would  tend to be more protectionist  than its members  would have been alone.24
In addition  to those results, Grossman  and Helpman (1994)  also show  that free trade agreements
are most likely to emerge where there is relative  balance  in intemal trade; and where the protectionism
of a high price partner can be captured by the expordng industries  of other cuntries,  rather than when
the low prices of a liberalized  member  would be transferred  to all oDmpeting  industries  within  the bloc.
Whether the latter would actually happen depends on the market power of the industries  in the low
price/low tariff economies, or equivalently  on whether they can supply all or only part of the high
price/high  tariff country's demand,  ji  on the bloc's policy towards external  tariffs  - all of which will
be a matter of particular cases, with the general implication  that trading blocs will tend to occur where
they are least helpful in terms of maintaininglraising  aggregate economic welfare.  That of course
reinforces our earlier conclusions  that regional blocs may well prove to be more protectionist  than is
members would have been alone, and that the proliferation  of regional blocs increases the need for
GAIT-type disciplines.  Thus this "political economy" approach  tends to strengthen the conclusions
already reached  in the context  of the wstrategic  behavior  analysis  of section  EL
V.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The picture that emerges  from our analysis  is not an optimistic  one with respect  to the future  role
of RIAs in advancing  a liberal  trade order. We agree with the proposition  that regionalism  is here to stay
(actaly,  it has never left the stage in the post-World  War H period). What is not as clear is the fite
role of these arrangements  in paving the way for multilateral  cooperation. It is true that RIAs did not
choke  the process of international  economic  integration  in the past?  The future, however, may not be
Given our observations  at the end of section  II.  3, it may be interesting  to extend  this Grossman  -
Helpman type analysis to 3-cuntry,  3-sector  interactions  where one of the players is a sector based
(rather tha  country based) actor, such as the Cairns group (the coalition of countries in fvor  of
agricultural  tzada libcralization  in the Uruguay Round).  One could then analyze  how the coalition's
behavior would  dhange  as the trading rules are extended.
2  For details see Anderson  and Norheim  (1993).30
a replay  of the past given  the emergence  of new trading  blocs  with market  power,  the evident  need  for
a credible  commitment  mechanism,  and lingering  doubts  about  the capacity  of the GAIT system  in
disciplining  "cheaters' in an effective  way. In short, it seems  unlikely  that  RIAs  could  work  as building
blocs  to a "perfect"  GATT.
The propensity  of larger  RIAs  to follow  noncooperative  behavior  will depend  on the relative
importance  of extra-bloc  trade. If the benefits  from extra-bloc  trade remain  significant,  export-oriented
interests  will serve as a counterweight  to  interventionist  forces.  Actually,  there is evidence  that
regionalism  has not  reversed  the  process  of international  economic  integration.  In other  words,  although
intra-regional  trade has been  growing  in the post-World  War It period  this has not choked  integration
between  regions  (Anderson  and  Norheim,  1993). As economic  interdependence  increases,  episodes  of
noncooperation  may  generate  enough  costs  to stimulate  periods  of liberalization.26  It can also  be argued
that if the bloc becomes  big enough,  intra-bloc  competition  may be sufficient  to foster economic
restracturing,  diminishing  the constituency  for protection  of "sunset' industries. The growing  market
power of the large trading  blocs,  however,  does not bode well either  for the fate of the multilateal
system  or for those  left behind  by the major  RIAs.
The conclusion  of the Uruguay  Round  diminished  the likelihood  that wncooperative  behavior
between  large  RIAs  will escalate  -in  the short run.  Still,  for developing  countries,  the potential  impact
of these  large  trading  blocs  on their  trade  and  investment  opportnities  is a legitimate  matter  for concern.
South-South  RIAs,  organized  as defensive  coalitions,  are unlikely  to be strong  enough  to insulate  these
countries  from the effects  of non-cooperative  behavior  by large blocs.  Moreover,  the alternative  of
climbing  on the larger  blocs  bandwagon  is  only  a real  possibility  (as illustrated  by the EC-Eastern  Europe
Association  Agreements  and NAFrA)  for a limited  number  of developing  countries  for the foreseeable
future.  Secor-oriented  North-South  coalitions,  as illustrated  by the Cairns Group with respect  to
agriculture,  could  be mentioned  as an alternative  strategy. The effective  capacity  of such  coalitions  to
shield  participating  developing  countries  from noncooperative  behavior  by large blocs, however,  also
seems limited, except possibly where they can exert significant  market power in  a  particular
(economically  strategic)  commodity  market. OPEC  has attempted  to play  that role.
:  For an analysis  of the dynamic  process  behind  protection,  retaliation  and  trade wars,  see Gould
and  Woodbridge  (1993).31
Ironically, the best alternative  for developing countries continues  to be a working (even tough
imperfect) multilateral trade system, able to  call attention to  excesses by those with market power.
Although our analysis qualifies the hope for a major strengthening of the multilateral regime, it can
continue  to play a fimdamental  role in making the negative  effects of discrimination  and protection  more
transparent. Moreover, the fiture WTO is the only hope for a multilateral  agency able to constrain the
actions of large trading blocs.
J.32
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Appendix:  Simultaneous  and Overlapping  Games
Consider  first a standard  3 player  game,  where  each  players  tries  to minimize  some  loss function
L 1defined  over his/her  policy  targets,  subject  to a set of constraints  which  define  what is (and is
not)  technically  feasible  for the available  policy  instruments  to achieve:
t  =  : tl ll  R23  (l) 
where  x, y. z and u, v, w are the targets  and  the instuments  of players  1, 2 and 3 respectively
(and  the Si terms  represent  external  shocks). Thus  RB  describe  the domestic  target  responses  to
policy  changes  and R 1 (i￿j)  describe  the spillover  effect onto other  players. Then:
(a)  An overlaoping  game  would  take the same  form except  that R,3=0 and Ro6  =0 would  be
imposed  with  players  1 and 3 interacting  solely  through  their interdependence  with  the link  player,
player  2.  That interdependence  is nevertheless  clear  to see; the inverse  R1, for example,  has no
zero restrictions.
(b)  A simultaneouvgaie  is rather  different. In a 2-player  case, (1) would  become
R^11  ?  SI,  0  RI
x:  =  ?  22  °  S22  U2  (2  s
Y,  rll  o  pi,  ?  .VI Y2  °l 0 os? 2 t  ~2
where  there  are two  separate  theatrs of rivalry  (subscripts  1 and 2).  There  may  be ineal
spillovers  toe two theaters for either player individually, (submatrices  marked U?U)  but there are no
spillovers  from  player  2 in theater  2 to player  1 in theater  1 (submatrices  marked 0") and vice
versa, or from player  1 in theater  2 to player  2 in theater  1, etc. Hence  the S and  T submatrices
in (2)  have  been  specified  to be block  diagonal,  even  if the R and P submatrices  are noL Finally,
the objectives  will also  be separable  over theaters:
LI = x'LQ 11xl + x'2Q,2x 2 and  L 2 =  y' 1Q2,y 1 +  y'1 2Q2y2 where  yflny 2=O  x,  nx=0, but
x flny 1 A  0.
Then te  symmetrical  version  of (2) will  have  R- = Pi, Si = T,;
while  direct  independence  implies  Si and  T, are zero  so that the games  themselves  become
separable.36
(c)  The  solutions  of all these  games  are available  from  standard  results. The overlapping  game
was standard  3-player  game  with some  zero restrictions,  and  our simultaneous  game  could  be
treated  as a 4-player  game  with a (cooperative)  coalition  between  x, and x: and  another  between  y,
and  Y2. Hence  the point  here is to evaluate  the  pattern  of interdependence  rather  than  to construct
new  types  of solutions. In an overlapping  game  ("widening"  the bloc)  the interactions  are all
indirect,  via the adjustments  that  the actions  which  one  player  might  induce  in a link  player  with
whom  both  players  of interest  interact  directly. Those  adjustments  by the link player  then  call for
*a  response  by the  third  player. In a simultaneous  game  ("deepening"  the bloc),  the interactions  are
similarly  indirect. Because  both  players  know  they  interact  in each  of two theaters,  there is scope
for trading  off concession  by one of them  in one  theater  for a gain  by that  player  in the other
theater  - even  if there is no direct  spillovers  between  theaters.
(d)  Some  exampl:  i) Wideninr  - Greece  and Norway  (as a potential  new  entrant)  would  not
affect  each  other  much  directly  within  the EC "bloc." But both  affect  Germany  through  the fiscal
contributions  which  the latter  has to make  to the EC budget  which  supports  Greece  via its cohesion
fimds  and Norway  (on accession)  through  the special  agricultural  and fisheries  program. Thus  if
Greece  were to adjust  its policies,  so as to produce  a better  economic  performance  and  higher
growth,  it would  have  less  call on the cohesion  fumds.  Those  adjustments  would  therefore  affect
Germany,  and Germany's  responses  would  affect  Norway  in turn:  an overlapping  game;  ii)
Deepening  - The  EC's trade  and industrial  policy  and its monetary  union  program  are considered
separate  iniatives, which  don't interact  directly.  (It is technically  possible  to have  one without  the
other.) But  Germany  is prepared  to surrender  control  over  its currency  for a (possibly  inferior)
European  cunency  in order  to guarantee  afr  access  to those  wider  European  markets. A
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